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Abstract—Face recognition has evolved as a widely used bio-
metric modality. However, its vulnerability against presentation
attacks poses a significant security threat. Though presentation
attack detection (PAD) methods try to address this issue, they
often fail in generalizing to unseen attacks. In this work, we
propose a new framework for PAD using a one-class classifier,
where the representation used is learned with a Multi-Channel
Convolutional Neural Network (MCCNN). A novel loss function
is introduced, which forces the network to learn a compact em-
bedding for bonafide class while being far from the representation
of attacks. A one-class Gaussian Mixture Model is used on top
of these embeddings for the PAD task. The proposed framework
introduces a novel approach to learn a robust PAD system from
bonafide and available (known) attack classes. This is particularly
important as collecting bonafide data and simpler attacks are
much easier than collecting a wide variety of expensive attacks.
The proposed system is evaluated on the publicly available
WMCA multi-channel face PAD database, which contains a wide
variety of 2D and 3D attacks. Further, we have performed
experiments with MLFP and SiW-M datasets using RGB channels
only. Superior performance in unseen attack protocols shows
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Software, data, and
protocols to reproduce the results are made available publicly.
Index Terms—Presentation Attack Detection, Convolutional
Neural Network, Face Recognition, Anti-spoofing, Reproducible
Research, Unseen Attack Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
FACE recognition has proved to be a beneficial modalityfor biometric authentication. One of the main reasons for
the widespread use of face recognition systems is its non-
intrusive nature of acquisition and ease of use [1]. Face recog-
nition systems have matured a lot in recent years, and several
approaches have reported human parity in the identification
rate in ‘in the wild’ conditions [2]. However, a critical security
issue undermining the widespread use of face recognition
technology is its vulnerability to presentation attacks (a.k.a
spoofing attacks) [3], [4].
Presentation attack refers to an attack using an instrument
with the intention to affect the normal operation of the
biometric system. Often, features such as color, texture [5],
[6], motion [7], and physiological cues [8], [9] and CNN
based methods [10] are used for detection of attacks like 2D
prints and replays. However, detection of sophisticated attacks
like 3D masks and partial attacks are challenging and poses a
serious threat to the reliability of face recognition systems.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the embedding space with known and unknown attack
classes. The red dotted line shows the decision boundary learned when only
bonafide and known attacks are present in the training set, this results in
misclassification of unknown attacks as bonafide. If a one class decision
boundary (green-dotted lines) is learned, then both known and unknown
attacks can be classified correctly.
Most of the presentation attack detection (PAD) methods
available in prevailing literature try to solve the problem
for a limited number of presentation attack instruments and
on visible spectrum images [3]. Though some success has
been achieved in addressing 2D presentation attacks, perfor-
mance of the algorithms in realistic 3D masks and other
kinds of attacks is poor. With the increase in quality of
attack instruments, it becomes harder to discriminate between
bonafide and PAs in the visible spectrum alone. Moreover,
considering a real-world situation with a wide variety of
2D, 3D, and partial attacks, PAD in visual spectra alone is
challenging and inadequate for security-critical applications.
Partial attacks refer to attacks where the attack instrument
covers only a part of the face. These attacks are much harder
to detect as they appear similar to bonafide in most of the
face regions, and they can fool holistic liveliness detection
systems easily. Multi-channel methods have been proposed as
an alternative [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [15], [17], since
they use complementary information from different channels
to improve the discrimination between bonafide and attacks. In
the multi-channel scenario, the additional channels used can be
any modality which can provide complementary representation
such as depth, infrared, and thermal channels. Multi-channel
PAD approaches are more promising in the context of a wide
variety of attacks since they make PAD systems harder to fool.
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2Even with the use of multiple channels, one of the main is-
sues with PAD is its poor generalization to unseen attacks [14].
This is particularly important, since at the time of developing
a PAD system, anticipating all possible attacks is impossible.
Malicious attackers can always come up with new attacks
to fool the PAD systems. In such situations, PAD systems
which are robust against unseen attacks are of paramount
importance. Moreover, while it is comparatively easy to collect
data for attacks like 2D prints and replays, making replicas of
challenging presentation attack instruments (PAI) like silicone
mask are often very costly [18] and resource-intensive. In this
context, it will be ideal to have a framework which can be
trained with bonafide alone, or with a combination of bonafide
and easy to manufacture PAIs.
In real-world scenarios, it can be assumed that all presen-
tation attacks are unseen, as it is not possible to foretell all
the variations a PAD system could encounter a priori. A toy
example of the decision boundary in an unseen attack scenario
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Performances in typical PAD databases
may not be representative of the performance of a PAD system
in real-world conditions. This necessitates the PAD algorithms
to be robust against unseen attacks. Since it is easy (in effort
and cost) to collect data from more straightforward attacks
compared to complex PAIs, we try to learn the representation
leveraging the information from PA classes which are available
at the training stage (while not over-fitting on the available
attacks). To achieves this, we propose a one-class classifier
based framework, where the feature representation is learned
with a CNN to have discriminative properties. The core
of the framework is a multi-channel CNN trained to learn
the embedding using a specific loss function. The proposed
approach aims at learning a compact representation for the
bonafide class while leveraging the discriminative information
for PAD task.
The main contributions of the paper are listed below.
• A novel multi-channel one-class classifier-based approach
is proposed for unseen attack detection.
• A novel loss function is proposed which learns a compact
and discriminative representation of the face for PAD
task, leveraging the information provided from known
attacks.
The features used in the one class classifier are learned with
a multi-channel CNN framework. The proposed approach was
evaluated in known and unseen attack protocols in WMCA
database containing a wide variety of 2D and 3D attacks,
and performed significantly better than baselines in unseen
protocols. We have also performed experiments using RGB
channel in MLFP and SiW-M datasets.
Additionally, the source code and protocols to reproduce the
results are made available publicly and are accessible at the
following link 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the related work with a particular focus on unseen
attack detection. Section 3 outlines the proposed framework.
Extensive evaluations, comparison with baseline methods, and
ablation studies are shown in section 4. Section 5 discusses
1Source code: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.paper.oneclass mccnn 2019
the importance of the results, and Section 6 presents the
conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Majority of the literature in face PAD is mainly focused on
2D attacks and uses feature-based methods [5], [6], [7],[8], [9]
or CNN based methods. Recently, CNN based methods have
been more successful as compared to feature-based methods
[19], [10], [20], [21]. These methods usually leverage the
quality degradation during ‘recapture’ and are often useful
only for the detection of attacks like 2D prints and replays.
Sophisticated attacks like 3D masks are more challenging
and pose serious threat to the reliability of face recognition
systems.
Most of these methods handle the PAD problem as binary
classification, which results in classifiers over-fitting to the
known attacks resulting in poor generalization to unseen
attacks. We focus the further discussion on the detection of
unseen attacks. However, it is imperative that methods working
for unseen attacks must perform accurately for known attacks
as well. One naive solution for such a task is one-class classi-
fiers (OCC). OCC provides a straightforward way of handling
the unseen attack scenario by modeling the distribution of the
bonafide class alone.
Arashloo et al.[22] and Nikisins et al. [23] have shown
the effectiveness of one class methods against unseen attacks.
Even though these methods performed better than binary clas-
sifiers in an unseen attack scenario, the performance in known
attack protocols was inferior to that of binary classifiers. Xiong
et al. [24] proposed unseen PAD methods using auto-encoders
and one class classifiers with texture features extracted from
images. However, the performance of the methods compared to
recent CNN based methods is very poor. CNN based methods
outperform most of the feature-based baselines for PAD task.
Hence there is a clear need of one class classifiers or anomaly
detectors in the CNN framework. One of the drawbacks of one
class model is that they do not use the information provided
by the known attacks. An anomaly detector framework which
utilizes the information from the known attacks could be more
efficient.
Perera and Patel [25] presented an approach for one-class
transfer learning in which labelled data from an unrelated task
is used for feature learning. They used two loss functions,
namely descriptive loss, and compactness loss to learn the
representations. The data from the class of interest is used to
calculate the compactness loss whereas an external multi-class
dataset is used to compute the descriptive loss. Accuracy of the
learned model in classification using another database is used
as the descriptive loss. However, in the face PAD problem, this
approach would be challenging since the bonafide and attack
classes appear very similar.
Fatemifar et al. [26] proposed an approach to ensemble
multiple one-class classifiers for improving the generaliza-
tion of PAD. They introduced a class-specific normalization
scheme for the one class scores before fusion. Seven regions,
three one class classifiers and representations from three CNNs
were used in the pool of classifiers. Though their method
3achieved better performance as compared to client independent
thresholds, the performance is inferior to CNN based state of
the art methods. Specifically, many CNN based approaches
have achieved 0% HTER in Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile
datasets. Moreover, the challenging unseen attack scenario is
not evaluated in this work.
Pe´rez-Cabo et al. [27] proposed a PAD formulation from
an anomaly detection perspective. A deep metric learning
model is proposed, where a triplet focal loss is used as a
regularization for ‘metric-softmax’, which forces the network
to learn discriminative features. The features learned in such
a way is used together with an SVM with RBF kernel for
classification. They have performed several experiments on an
aggregated RGB only datasets showing the improvement made
by their proposed approach. However, the analysis is mostly
limited to RGB only models and 2D attacks. Challenging 3D
and partial attacks are not considered in this work. Specifically,
the effectiveness in challenging unknown attacks (2D vs 3D)
is not evaluated.
Recently, Liu et al. [28] proposed an approach for the
detection of unknown spoof attacks as Zero-Shot Face Anti-
spoofing (ZSFA). They proposed a Deep Tree Network (DTN)
which partitions the attack samples into semantic sub-groups
in an unsupervised manner. Each tree node in their network
consists of a Convolutional Residual Unit (CRU) and a Tree
Routing Unit (TRU). The objective is to route the unknown
attacks to the most proper leaf node for correctly classifying
it. They have considered a wide variety of attacks in their
approach and their approach achieved superior performance
compared to the considered baselines.
Jaiswal et al. [29] proposed an end to end deep learning
model for PAD which used unsupervised adversarial invari-
ance. In their method, the discriminative information and
nuisance factors are disentangled in an adversarial setting.
They showed that by retaining only discriminative information,
the PAD performance improved for the same base architecture.
Mehta et al. [30] trained an Alexnet model with a combination
of cross-entropy and focal losses. They extracted the features
from Alexnet and trained a two-class SVM for PAD task.
However, results in challenging datasets such as OULU and
SiW were not reported.
Recently Joshua and Jain [31] utilized multiple GANs
for spoof detection in fingerprints. Their method essentially
consisted of training a DCGAN [32] using only the bonafide
samples. At the end of the training, the generator is dis-
carded, and the discriminator is used as the PAD classifier.
They combined the results from different GANs operating on
different features. However, this approach may not work well
for face images as the recaptured images look very similar to
the bonafide samples.
In safety critical applications, extended range methods have
been proposed over the years [11], [33], [12], [34], [35], [18],
[13], [14] to achieve reliable PAD performance. Even these
methods fail in generalizing to unseen attacks.
Wang et al. [36] proposed multimodal face presentation
attack detection with a ResNet based network using both
spatial and channel attentions. Specifically, the approach was
tailored for the CASIA-SURF [37] database which contained
RGB, near-infrared and depth channels. The proposed model is
a multi-branch model where the individual channels and fused
data are used as inputs. Each input channel has its own feature
extraction module and the features extracted are concatenated
in a late fusion strategy. Followed by more layers to learn a
discriminative representation for PAD. The network training
is supervised by both center loss and softmax loss. One key
point is the use of spatial and channel attention to fully utilize
complementary information from different channels. Though
the proposed approach achieved good results in the CASIA-
SURF database, the challenging problem of unseen attack
detection is not addressed.
Parkin et al. [38] proposed a multi-channel face PAD
network based on ResNet. Essentially, their method consists of
different ResNet blocks for each channel followed by fusion.
Squeeze and excitation modules (SE) are used before fusing
the channels, followed by remaining residual blocks. Further,
they add aggregation blocks at multiple levels to leverage
inter-channel correlations. Their approach achieved state of the
art results in CASIA-SURF [37] database. However, the final
model presented in is a combination of 24 neural networks
trained with different attack specific folds, pre-trained models
and random seeds, which would increase the computation
greatly.
From the discussions above, it can be seen that one class
classifiers could be a good alternative for binary classification
in PAD task. However, the features used for one class clas-
sifiers should be discriminative and compact to outperform
binary classification.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
From a practical viewpoint, it is not possible to anticipate
all the possible types of attacks and to have them in the
training set. This, in turn, make the PAD task an unseen
classification problem in a broad sense. In general, we can
even consider attacks coming from different replay devices as
unseen attacks. Typically, one class classifiers are well suited
for such outlier detection tasks. However, in practice, the
performance of one class classifiers are inferior compared to
binary classifiers for known attacks, since they do not leverage
useful information from the known attacks. Ideally, the PAD
system should perform well in both known and unseen attack
scenarios.
Clearly, there is a necessity of a method which can learn a
compact one class representation while utilizing the discrim-
inative information from known attacks. While the collection
of attacks could be difficult and costly, collecting bonafide
samples are rather easy. A new classification strategy is
required to handle the realistic scenario where a limited variety
of attack classes are available.
Though one class classifiers (OCC) offers a way to model
the bonafide class, the efficient use of OCC requires the feature
representation to be compact while containing discriminative
information for PAD task. In the proposed framework, we use
a CNN based approach to learn the feature representation. A
novel loss function is proposed to learn a representation of
bonafide samples leveraging the known attack classes.
4A. Formulation of One Class Contrastive Loss (OCCL)
Consider a typical CNN architecture for PAD, where the
output layer contains one node and the loss function used is
Binary Cross Entropy (BCE), which is defined as:
LBCE = −(y log(p) + (1− y) log(1− p)) (1)
where y is the ground truth, (y = 0 for attack and y = 1 for
bonafide) and p is the probability.
When trained only with BCE loss, the network learns a
decision boundary based on the bonafide and attacks present
in the training set. However, it may not generalize when
encountered with an unseen attack in the test time as it could
be over-fitted to attacks which are ‘known’ from the training
set.
To overcome this issue, we propose the ‘One-Class Con-
trastive Loss’ (OCCL) function which operates on the em-
bedding layer. Proposed One-Class Contrastive Loss (OCCL)
function is used as an auxiliary loss function in conjunction
with binary cross-entropy loss. The feature map obtained
from the penultimate layer of the CNN is used as the em-
bedding. The loss function is inspired from center-loss [39]
and contrastive loss [40], which are usually used in the face
recognition applications.
Fig. 2. Loss functions acting on the embedding space, left) bonafide
representations are pulled closer to the center of bonafide class (green), while
the attack embeddings(red) are forced to be beyond the margin. The attack
samples outside the margin does not contribute to the loss, right) The loss as
a function of distance from the bonafide center.
In face recognition applications, center loss is used as an
additional auxiliary loss function, the task of the center loss
is to minimize the distance of the embeddings from their
corresponding class centers. The center loss is defined as:
Lcenter = 1
2
m∑
i=1
‖xi − cyi‖22 (2)
Where Lcenter denotes the center loss, m the number of
training samples in a mini-batch, xi ∈ Rd denotes the ith
training sample, yi denotes the label, and cyi denotes the y
th
i
class center in the embedding space.
The main issue with center loss in the PAD application is
that the loss function penalizes for large intra-class distances
and does not care about the inter-class distances. Contrastive
center loss [41] tries to solve this issue by adding the distance
between classes (inter-class) in the formulation. However, for
the PAD problem, modeling the attack class as a cluster and
finding a center for the attack class is not trivial. The attacks
could be of different categories: 2D, 3D, and partial attacks,
and it is not ideal forcing them to cluster together in the
embedding space. It is only necessary to have the embeddings
of attacks far from bonafide cluster in the embedding space.
Hence, we put the compactness constraint only on the bonafide
class, while forcing the embeddings of PAs to be far from that
of bonafide.
To formulate the loss function, we start with the equation
for contrastive loss function proposed by Lecun et al. [40].
LContrastive(W,Y,X1, X2) =(1− Y )1
2
D2W
+ Y
1
2
max(0,m−DW )2
(3)
Where W is the network weights, X1, X2 are the pairs
and Y the label of the pair, i.e., whether they belong to the
same class or not. m is the margin, and DW is the distance
function between two samples. The data is provided as pairs
(X1, X2) and the distance function DW can be computed as
the Euclidean distance.
DW =
√
‖X1 −X2‖22 (4)
Now, in our loss formulation, the critical difference is how
we define DW . In the original contrastive loss, DW is the dis-
tance between samples. In our case, we need the representation
of bonafide samples to be compact in an embedding space. At
the same time, we want to maximize the distance between
bonafide cluster and attack samples in the embedding space.
This can be achieved by defining DCW to be the distance
from the center of bonafide class as follows.
DCW =
√
‖Xi − cBF ‖22 (5)
Where Xi is the embedding for ith sample, and cBF is the
center of bonafide class in the embedding space.
The center of the bonafide class is updated in every mini-
batch during training as follows.
cBF = cˆBF (1− α) + α 1
N
N∑
i=1
ei (6)
Where cBF and cˆBF denotes the new and old bonafide-
centers. α is a scalar which prevents sudden changes in the
class centers in mini-batch. ei denotes the difference between
embeddings for the bonafide samples in the current mini-batch
compared to the previous center, and N denotes the number
of bonafide samples in the mini-batch.
Combining the equations, our auxiliary loss function be-
comes:
LOCCL(W,Y,X) =Y 1
2
DC2W
+ (1− Y )1
2
max(0,m−DCW )2
(7)
Where DCW denotes the Euclidean distance between the
samples and the bonafide class center, Y denotes the ground
5Fig. 3. Preprocessed images from a rigid mask attack; channels showed are gray-scale, infrared, depth, and thermal, respectively. Channels were preprocessed
with face detection, alignment and normalization.
truth, i.e., Y = 0 for attacks and Y = 1 for bonafide (note
the change in labels from the standard notation due to the
ground truth convention). It is to be noted that, the proposed
loss function does not require pairs of samples, which is a
requirement in usage of contrastive loss. This makes it easier
to train the model without requiring an explicit selection of
pairs during training.
This auxiliary loss makes the representation of bonafide
compact pushing it closer to the center of bonafide class and
penalizes attack samples which are closer than the margin m.
Attack samples which are farther than the margin m are not
penalized. An illustration of the loss functions acting on the
embeddings of bonafide and attack samples are shown in Fig.
2.
We combine the proposed loss function with standard binary
cross entropy for training. The combined loss function to
minimize is given as:
L = (1− λ)LBCE + λLOCCL (8)
Where L denotes the total loss for the CNN. LBCE and
LOCCL denotes the binary cross entropy, and one-class con-
trastive loss respectively. λ denotes a scalar value to set the
weight for each loss functions. In our experiments we set the
value of λ as 0.5.
The combined loss function L tries to learn a decision
boundary between the available attacks and bonafide while
the auxiliary loss tries to make the feature representation of
the bonafide compact in the embedding space. We expect the
decision boundary learned in this fashion to be more robust
in unseen attacks compared to the network learned only with
BCE. The embedding obtained in this manner is used with a
one-class classifier for the PAD task.
B. Components of the proposed framework
Different stages of the proposed framework are described
below.
1) Preprocessing: Before using the data from the sensors,
a preprocessing stage consisting of face detection, alignment,
and normalization is performed. MTCNN algorithm [42] was
used for face detection in the color channel followed by
face landmark detection using Supervised Descent Method
(SDM) [43]. After these stages, the face image is aligned and
converted to gray-scale with a resolution of 128× 128 pixels.
Since all the channels are aligned, these face locations are
utilized for the alignment of other non-RGB channels as well.
Also, normalization using Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD)
[44] is performed to convert the raw 16-bit values to the 8-bit
range. An example image after preprocessing stage is shown
in Fig. 3.
2) Network architecture and training: Since the data used is
multi-channel, we use a multi-channel PAD framework called
‘Multi-Channel Convolutional Neural Network’(MCCNN)
proposed in [14] as our base network. The main idea in
MCCNN was to use the joint representation from multiple
channels for PAD task, leveraging a pretrained face recog-
nition network. The MCCNN architecture constituted of an
extended version of LightCNN model [45] adapted specifically
for multi-channel PAD task. A pretrained LightCNN face
recognition model was extended to accept multiple channels,
and the embeddings from all channels were concatenated,
and two fully connected layers were added on top of this
joint representation layer for PAD task. The advantage in
this architecture is that only lower layer features (which are
known as Domain Specific Units (DSU) [46] ) and higher-
level fully connected layers are adapted in the training phase.
The first fully connected layer contains ten nodes, and the
second layer contains only one output node. The higher-
level features in the LightCNN part are shared among all the
modalities. This approach has two main advantages; first, there
is a smaller number of parameters since the high-level features
are shared across modalities, second, adapting only DSUs and
final fully connected layers reduce possible over-fitting since
PAD databases are typically small in size. An optimal set of
layers to be adapted was obtained empirically and was used
in the baseline MCCNN and the proposed approach.
In our proposed approach, we use the same MCCNN ar-
chitecture, and the output from the penultimate fully con-
nected layer was used as the embeddings. To quantify the
effectiveness of our approach, we perform experiments on
the MCCNN architecture, while using both embeddings and
the final output for the loss computation. An illustration of
the proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4. At the time of
training, both losses are used, and the model corresponding to
the lowest validation score is selected. It is to be noted that, at
the time of CNN training, both bonafide and (known) attack
samples are used. After the CNN training, the network weights
are frozen, and the bonafide samples are feed-forwarded to
obtain the embeddings.
3) One-Class Gaussian Mixture Model: After the training
of MCCNN with BCE and OCCL, the trained weights of
the network are frozen, and it is used as a fixed feature
6Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of the proposed framework. The CNN architecture is trained with two losses and then used as a fixed feature extractor with frozen
weights. The one-class GMM is trained using the embeddings obtained from bonafide class alone.
extractor for the PAD task. Now that a compact representation
is available, the objective is to learn a one-class classifier using
the features obtained. We use One-Class Gaussian Mixture
Model for this task. The one class GMM is a generative
approach which is used for modeling the distribution of the
bonafide class in the proposed framework.
A Gaussian Mixture Model is defined as the weighted sum
of K multivariate Gaussian distributions as:
p(x|Θ) =
K∑
k=1
wkN (x;µk,Σk), (9)
where Θ = {wk, µk, σk}{k=1,...,K} are the weights, means
and the covariance matrix of the GMM.
Expectation-Maximization (EM) [47] was used to compute
the parameters of the GMM. A full covariance matrix is
computed for each component, and the number of components
to use was empirically selected as five (K = 5).
During the training phase, embeddings obtained from
bonafide class only are used to train the One-Class GMM.
In test time, a sample is first forwarded though the network
to obtain the embedding x, and then fed to the One-Class
GMM to obtain the log-likelihood score as follows:
score = log(p(x|Θ)) (10)
In summary, the proposed framework can be considered as a
one-class classifier based framework for PAD. The crucial dis-
tinction is that, the features used are learned. The loss function
proposed forces the CNN to learn a compact representation
for the bonafide class leveraging the information from known
attack classes. The algorithm for training the framework is
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for training the proposed
framework
Data: (xi, yi), where xi is multi-channel input and
yi ∈ 0, 1; 0 – for attack and 1– for bonafide
Result: WC – CNN weights, ΘGMM – Parameters of
GMM
1 Constants : λ – weighting factor, µ – learning rate
2 Initialize : CBF – center of bonafide class, WC –
initial weights of CNN from pretrained model
3 for mini-batch ← 1 to P do
4 Forward xi through the CNN
5 Compute the combined loss:
L = (1− λ)LBCE + λLOCCL
6 Back-propagate the loss and update the weights of
DSUs and FC layers
7 Update the bonafide center:
8 cBF = cˆBF (1− α) + α 1N
∑N
i=1 ei
9 end
10 Forward xj (bonafide, where yj = 1) through the CNN
to obtain Embeddings Ej
11 Estimate parameters of GMM from Ej :
12 ΘGMM= (wk, µk,Σk)
13 Parameters← (WC ,ΘGMM )
C. Implementation details
To increase the number of samples, data augmentation using
random horizontal flips with a probability of 0.5 was used
in training. Adam Optimizer [48] was used to minimize the
combined loss function. Learning rate of 1×10−4 and a weight
decay parameter of 1 × 10−5 was used. The network was
trained for 50 epochs on GPU grid with a batch size of 32. The
model corresponding to minimum validation loss in the dev set
is selected as the best model. For the four-channel models, the
MCCNN architecture has about 13.1M parameters and about
714.5 GFLOPS. The implementation was done using PyTorch
[49] library.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach, we have performed experiments in three publicly
available databases, namely WMCA [14], MLFP [35], and
SiW-M [28] datasets. Recently published CASIA-SURF [37]
database also consists of multi-channel data, namely color,
depth, and infrared channels with a limited set of attack
instruments. However, the raw data from the sensors were
not publicly available; in the publicly available version of
the database, images were masked and scaled with custom
preprocessing reducing the dynamic range of depth and in-
frared channels severely. Moreover, there was no guaranteed
alignment between the channels. Therefore we can’t use our
framework with CASIA-SURF database due to the mentioned
limitations.
A. WMCA dataset
We have conducted an extensive set of experiments on
Wide Multi-Channel presentation Attack (WMCA) 2 database,
which contains a total of 1679 video samples of bonafide
and attack attempts from 72 identities. The database contains
information from four different channels collected simultane-
ously, namely, color, depth, infrared, and thermal channels.
The data was collected using two consumer devices, Intel R©
RealSenseTMSR300 capturing RGB-NIR-Depth streams, and
Seek Thermal CompactPRO for the thermal channel. The
database contained around eighty different PAIs constituting
seven different categories of attacks: print, replay, funny
eyeglasses, fake head, rigid mask, flexible silicone mask, and
paper masks. The RGB visualization of the attack categories is
shown in Fig. 5 and the different sessions in Fig. 6. Detailed
information about the WMCA database can be found in the
publication [14]. The statistics of the number of samples in
each category and their types are shown in Table I. We have
made challenging protocols in the WMCA dataset to perform
an extensive set of evaluations emulating real-world unseen
attack scenarios.
1) Protocols in WMCA: To test the performance of the
algorithm in known and unseen attack scenarios, we created
three protocols in the WMCA dataset. The protocols are
described below.
• grandtest : This is the exact same grandtest protocol
available with WMCA database, here all the attack types
are present in almost equal proportions in the train,
development and evaluation sets. The attack types and
bonafide samples are divided into three folds, and the
client ids are disjoint across the three sets. Each presen-
tation attack instrument had a separate client id. The train,
dev, eval splits were made in such a way that a specific
PA instrument will appear in only one fold.
• unseen-2D : In this protocol, we use same splits as
grandtest and removed all 2D attacks from train and de-
velopment groups. Evaluation set contains only bonafide
2Database available at : https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/wmca
Fig. 5. Attack categories in WMCA dataset, only RGB images are shown.
Print and Replay constitutes the 2D attacks and all others are 3D attacks
(Image taken from [14]).
Fig. 6. Different sessions in WMCA dataset, only RGB images are shown. A
total of six sessions was used the WMCA (Image taken from [14])
and 2D attacks. This emulates the performance of a
system when encountered with 2D attacks which was not
seen in training.
• unseen-3D : In this protocol, we use same splits as
grandtest and removed all 3D attacks from train and de-
velopment groups. Evaluation set contains only bonafide
and 3D attacks. This emulates the performance of a
system when encountered with 3D attacks which were
not seen in training. This is the most challenging protocol
as the model sees only the simpler 2D attacks in training
and encounter challenging 3D attacks in testing.
While the grandtest protocol emulates the known attack
scenario, other protocols emulate the unseen attack scenario.
All protocols are made available publicly.
8TABLE I
STATISTICS OF ATTACKS IN WMCA DATABASE
PA Category Type #Presentations
bonafide - 347
glasses Partial 75
print 2D 200
replay 2D 348
fake head 3D 122
rigid mask 3D 137
flexible mask 3D 379
paper mask 3D 71
TOTAL 1679
B. MLFP dataset
MLFP dataset [35] consists of attacks captured with seven
3D latex masks and three 2D print attacks. The dataset contains
videos captured from color, thermal and infrared channels.
Since channels were captured individually in different record-
ing sessions, multi-channel approaches are not trivial. Also,
the alignment of channels is not possible since they are not
collected simultaneously. Hence, we only use the RGB videos
from the MLFP dataset for our experiments. The database
contains videos of 10 subjects wearing both print and latex
masks. There are 440 videos are consisting of both attacks
and bonafide for the RGB channel.
1) Protocols in MLFP: To emulate known and unseen
attack scenarios, we created three new protocols in the MLFP
dataset. There are two types of attacks, namely print and mask.
Only two sets, i.e., train and evaluation are created due to the
small size of the dataset. We used a subset of the train set
(10%) for model selection. The protocols are described below.
• grandtest : This protocol emulates the known attack
scenario. Both the attacks are present in both train and
evaluation set. However, the subjects and the PAs are
disjoint across the two sets.
• unseen-print : In this protocol, only bonafide and mask
attacks are present in train set; the evaluation set contains
only bonafide and print attacks. This emulates unseen
attack scenario.
• unseen-mask : In this protocol, only bonafide and print
attacks are present in train set; the evaluation set con-
tains only bonafide and mask attacks. This protocol also
emulates unseen attack scenario.
C. SiW-M dataset
The Spoof in the Wild database with Multiple Attack Types
(SiW-M) [28] consists of a wide variety of attacks captured
only in RGB spectra. The database consists of images from
493 subjects, and a total of 660 bonafide and 968 attack
samples. A total of 1628 files, consisting of 13 different
attack types, collected in different sessions, pose, lighting,
and expression (PIE) variations. The attacks consist of various
types of masks, makeups, partial attacks, and 2D attacks. The
videos are available in 1080P resolution.
1) Protocols in SiW-M: To emulate unseen attack scenarios,
we use the leave-one-out (LOO) testing protocols available
with the SiW-M [28] dataset. The protocols consists of only
train and eval sets. In each LOO protocol, the training set
consists of 80% percentage of the live data and 12 types
of spoof attacks. The evaluation set consists of 20% of
bonafide data and the attack which was left out in the training
phase. The subjects in bonafide sets are disjoint in train and
evaluation sets. A subset of the train set (5%) was used for
model selection. Additionally, we have created a grandtest
protocol, specifically for cross-database testing which contains
all the attack types in all the folds.
D. Evaluation metrics
We report the standardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [4],
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER), and
Bonafide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER), and
Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) in the test set. A
BPCER threshold of 1% is used for computing the threshold in
dev set. The APCER and BPCER in both dev and eval sets are
also reported. Additionally, the ROC curves for experiments
are also shown in all the protocols. For the MLFP dataset,
we report only EER in the evaluation set since only two
sets are available. For SiW-M database, we apply a threshold
selected a-priori in all protocols, for computing the metrics,
to be comparable with the results in [28].
E. Baselines
We have implemented three feature-based baselines and
two CNN based baselines. For a fair comparison, all the
benchmarks are multi-channel methods and use the same four
channels. Besides, an RGB only CNN model is also added for
comparison. A short description of the baselines along with
the acronyms used are shown below:
• MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM: This baseline is the multi-
channel extension of the RDWT-Haralick-SVM approach
proposed in [35]; the images from all channels are
stacked together after preprocessing. For each channel,
the image is divided into a 4 × 4 grid, and Haralick
[50] features obtained from the RDWT decompositions
are concatenated from all the grids in all channels to get
the joint feature vector. The joint feature is used with a
linear SVM for PAD.
• MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM: Here, the feature extraction
stage is same as MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM; however, the
classifier used is one class GMM. Only bonafide samples
are used in training this model. This model is added to
show the performance of one class models in unseen
attack scenarios.
• MC-LBP-SVM: Here, again, the same preprocessing is
performed on all the channels first. After this, Spatially
enhanced histograms of LBP representation from all the
component channels are computed and concatenated to a
feature vector. The features extracted are fed to an SVM
for PAD task.
• DeepPixBiS : This is a CNN based system [10] trained
using both binary and pixel-wise binary loss function.
This model only uses RGB information for PAD.
9• MC-ResNetPAD: We reimplemented the architecture from
[38] extending it to four channels, based on their open-
source implementation 3. This approach obtained the first
place solution in the ‘CASIA-SURF’ challenge. For a fair
comparison, instead of using an ensemble we used the
best pretrained model as suggested in [38].
• MCCNN(BCE) : This is the multi-channel CNN system
described in [14], which achieved state of the art per-
formance in the grandtest protocol. The model is trained
using Binary Cross-Entropy (BCE) loss only.
All the baseline methods described are reproducible, and the
details about the parameters can be found in our open-source
package 4.
F. Experiments and Results in WMCA dataset
We have tested the baselines and the proposed approach in
three different protocols in WMCA. The proposed approach is
denoted as MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM.
• MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM: Here, the bonafide embed-
dings from the MCCNN trained using both the losses are
used to train a GMM, and in the evaluation stage, the
score from the one class GMM is used as the PAD score.
The results in each protocol are described below.
1) Experiments in grandtest protocol: The grandtest pro-
tocol emulates the known attack scenario. Table II tabulates
the results in the grandtest protocol. The proposed approach
outperforms the feature-based methods by a large margin as
expected. The model MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM trained using
a one-class model achieves the worse results. It is interesting
to note that the MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM model, trained using
the same feature as a binary classifier performed much better.
This shows one weakness of one-class classifiers in a known
attack scenario, as they do not use the known attacks in
training. The MCCNN(BCE) achieves much better perfor-
mance as compared to MC-ResNetPAD. The MCCNN(BCE)
trained as a binary classifier achieves the best performance
in this protocol. The proposed MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM
approach achieves comparable performance to MCCNN(BCE).
This indicates that the one class GMM classifier performs on
par with the binary classification, provided they are trained
with compact feature representations.
2) Experiments in unseen-2D and unseen-3D protocol: The
unseen-2D and unseen-3D protocols emulates the unseen at-
tack scenario. The unseen-3D is the most challenging protocol
since it is trained only on 2D - print and replay attacks and
encounters a wide variety of 3D attacks such as silicone masks,
fake heads, mannequins, etc. in the eval set.
Most of the approaches perform well in the unseen-2D
protocol. This result is intuitive as these models are trained
on challenging 3D attacks, detection of 2D attacks is much
easier. Moreover, the 2D attacks can be easily identified in
depth, thermal, and infrared channels. Even some feature-
based methods perform well in this protocol, with MC-RDWT-
Haralick-GMM method achieving the best performance. This
3Available from: https://github.com/AlexanderParkin/ChaLearn liveness
challenge
4Source code: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.paper.oneclass mccnn 2019
shows the advantage of one class model in an unseen at-
tack scenario. The proposed approach MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-
GMM and MCCNN(BCE) baseline perform comparably in
this protocol. Notably, the DeepPixBiS model achieves much
worse results in this protocol. This could be because discrimi-
nating between bonafide and 2D attacks are harder when only
RGB information is used.
The unseen-3D protocol shows important results. All the
baselines show inferior performance when encountered with
unseen 3D samples. This shows the failure of binary clas-
sifiers in generalizing to challenging unseen attacks. The
MCCNN(BCE) approach, while being architecturally similar,
fails to generalize when trained in the binary classification
setting. With the proposed approach, performance improves
to 9.7% when the one class GMM is used on the bonafide
representations. Since the network learns to map the bonafide
samples to a compact cluster in the feature space, even in the
presence of unseen attacks, the decision boundary learned for
the bonafide class is robust. The unseen attacks map far from
the bonafide cluster and hence becomes easy to discriminate
from bonafide samples. This result is encouraging since the
network was shown only 2D attacks in training, and still, it
manages to achieve good performance against challenging 3D
attacks. The ROCs for all the protocols are shown in Fig. 7.
The t-SNE [51] plots of the embeddings for all protocols are
shown in Fig. 8. Five frames from each video in the evaluation
sets of the protocols are used for this visualization. While
the difference between bonafide and attacks are clear in the
grandtest and unseen-2D, difference in unseen-3D protocol is
very evident. It can be clearly seen that the bonafide class
clusters together and is far from the bonafide representation
in the embedding space in the unseen-3D protocol when the
proposed loss is used. Unseen attacks overlaps with bonafide
embeddings when only BCE is used. This clearly demonstrates
the effectiveness of the proposed approach for unseen attack
detection. The unseen attacks which are overlapping with
the bonafide region are shown in Fig. 9. It can be seen
that some video replay samples and flexible silicone 3D
masks get misclassified in unseen-2D and unseen-3D protocols
respectively.
3) Ablation study with channels: To evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed framework on different set of
channels, we perform an ablation study by including a dif-
ferent set of channels. We used only the best performing
MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM approach in this ablation study.
In all combinations, the gray-scale channel is present since it
is used as a reference. This is required as the embedding from
the gray-scale part can be used for face recognition as well.
The acronyms for different channels are shown below:
• G: Gray-scale image
• D: Depth image
• I: Infrared channel
• T: Thermal channel
Various combinations of these channels are experimented
with, and the results are tabulated in Table IV. It is to be
noted that the channels G, D and I come from the same device
and T is coming from a different device. Usually, thermal
cameras are expensive, compared to RGB-D cameras, and
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Fig. 7. DET curves for the eval sets of different protocols of WMCA dataset a) grandtest, b) unseen-2D, c) unseen-3D protocol.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OF THE BASELINE SYSTEMS AND THE PROPOSED METHOD IN grandtest PROTOCOL OF WMCA DATASET. THE VALUES REPORTED ARE
OBTAINED WITH A THRESHOLD COMPUTED FOR BPCER 1% IN dev SET.
Method dev (%) test (%)
APCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM 3.6 2.3 5.4 1.2 3.3
MC-LBP-SVM 3.6 2.3 8.5 0.6 4.6
MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM 43.4 22.2 47.7 1.7 24.7
DeepPixBiS (RGB only)[10] 1.0 1.0 8.2 3.7 6
MC-ResNetPAD [38] 3.8 2.4 3.5 1.6 2.6
MCCNN(BCE)[14] 0.4 0.7 0.5 0 0.2
MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF THE BASELINE SYSTEMS AND THE PROPOSED METHOD IN UNSEEN PROTOCOLS OF WMCA DATASET. THE VALUES REPORTED ARE
OBTAINED WITH A THRESHOLD COMPUTED FOR BPCER 1% IN dev SET.
Method unseen-2D unseen-3D
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM 0.3 0.1 0.2 66.0 0.1 33.1
MC-LBP-SVM 40.7 0.1 20.4 38.9 0.2 19.5
MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM 0.0 0.2 0.1 70.8 1.9 36.4
DeepPixBiS (RGB only)[10] 77.7 0.3 39 74.7 16.3 45.5
MC-ResNetPAD [38] 4.1 0.9 2.5 92.2 6.4 49.3
MCCNN(BCE)[14] 0.0 1.0 0.5 62.0 0.0 31.0
MCCNN(BCE+OCCL)-GMM 0.3 0.6 0.5 15.4 3.9 9.7
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(a) grandtest (b) unseen-2D (c) unseen-3D
(d) grandtest (e) unseen-2D (f) unseen-3D
Fig. 8. t-SNE plots of embeddings in the protocols in WMCA dataset. First row (a,b,c) shows the embeddings when only BCE loss was used. Second row
(d,e,f) shows the embeddings when both the losses are used. Embeddings of both known and unseen attacks are shown in the figures for each protocol.
Grandtest protocol contains only known attacks in the test set.
Fig. 9. The attack samples which are closer to bonafide cluster in a)
unseen-2D (Fig.8(E)) and b) unseen-3D ((Fig.8(F))) protocol for the proposed
framework.
hence the combinations involving subsets of G, D and I are
more interesting from a deployment point of view.
From Table IV, it can be seen that the performance de-
grades as channels are removed. However, the combination
GI achieves reasonable performance while considering the
performance-cost ratio. The ROCs for different protocols are
shown in Fig. 10.
G. Experiments and Results in MLFP dataset
We have used only the RGB channel for the experiments
since the other channels were not captured simultaneously. For
the MCCNN framework and other baselines, ‘R’, ‘G’, and ‘B’
are considered as the different channels in these experiments.
TABLE IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK WITH DIFFERENT
COMBINATIONS OF CHANNELS IN ALL PROTOCOLS OF WMCA DATASET.
THE VALUES REPORTED ARE OBTAINED WITH A THRESHOLD COMPUTED
FOR BPCER 1% IN dev SET.
Channels grandtest unseen-2D unseen-3DACER ACER ACER
GDIT 0.4 0.5 9.7
GDI 1.1 11.2 23.1
GT 2.2 3.2 21.5
GD 2.3 49.4 45.4
GI 1.1 2.2 22.6
We have performed the experiments in the three newly created
protocols and the results are tabulated in Table V.
From the results in Table V, it can be seen that the CNN
based approach outperforms the feature-based approaches.
The MCCNN framework, with the addition of the newly
proposed loss outperforms the architecture trained with BCE
only, showing the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Even though the proposed approach performs better than the
baselines, it is to be noted that the key point of the proposed
approach, leveraging multi-channel information, is not utilized
here. The architecture is not optimized for PAD in RGB
and this experiment is performed only to show the change
in performance with the new loss function. Nevertheless, the
proposed approach achieves better performance as compared
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Fig. 10. Ablation study with different combination of channels, DET curves for the eval sets of different protocols of WMCA dataset a) grandtest, b)
unseen-2D, c) unseen-3D protocol.
to the baselines in all the protocols.
TABLE V
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK IN THE PROTOCOLS IN
MLFP DATASET. ONLY RGB CHANNEL WAS USED IN THIS EXPERIMENTS.
THE VALUES REPORTED ARE THE EER IN THE evaluation SET.
Algorithm grandtest unseenprint
unseen
mask
MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM 9.8 12.0 32.2
MC-LBP-SVM 6.3 27.1 9.3
MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM 27.4 40.8 21.5
DeepPixBiS (RGB only)[10] 6.3 24.8 17.5
MCCNN (BCE) 5.5 9.2 5.2
MCCNN (BCE+OCCL)-GMM 1.2 3.3 3.4
H. Experiments and Results in SiW-M dataset
Table VI shows the performance of the proposed framework,
again in RGB only scenario. CNN based methods performs
much better than feature based methods in this case. It can
be seen that the proposed approach achieves better perfor-
mance as compared to baseline methods. The performance of
the MCCNN (BCE+OCCL)-GMM is better compared to the
MCCNN(BCE) model. It can be seen that the addition of the
new loss function makes the classification of unseen attacks
more accurate.
I. Cross-database evaluations
As we could not perform cross-database evaluation between
a multi-channel database and an RGB only database, we used
only the RGB channels from two datasets for the cross-
database evaluation. We have selected WMCA and SiW-M
datasets as they are relatively large and consist of a wide
variety of attacks.
From Table VII, it can be seen that the MCCNN model with
and without the new loss performs comparably. In general, the
performance in the cross-database setting is poor for all the
models. The poor performance could be due to the disparity in
acquisition conditions and the attack types. A wider variety of
attacks makes it difficult for the classifier to identify attacks
using RGB channels alone. The cross-database performance
with this wide variety of attacks seems more challenging
as compared to typical cross-database evaluations using only
2D attacks. Using multiple channels [14] may alleviate these
issues. This also points to the limitation of RGB only methods
while dealing with a wide variety of attacks.
V. DISCUSSIONS
From the experiments in WMCA database, it can be clearly
seen that CNN based method outperforms the feature-based
methods by a large margin. While comparing the MC-
CNN(BCE) method to the proposed method, the performance
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TABLE VI
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK IN THE LEAVE ONE OUT PROTOCOLS IN SiW-M DATASET. ONLY RGB CHANNEL WAS PRESENT IN THIS
DATASET.
Methods Metrics (%) Replay Print Mask Attacks Makeup Attacks Partial Attacks AverageHalf Silicone Trans. Paper Manne. Obfusc. Imperson. Cosmetic Funny Eye Paper Glasses Partial Paper
MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM
APCER 19.80 19.15 30.76 28.15 33.35 0.29 4.50 68.91 0.00 35.20 53.12 34.53 3.49 25.4± 20.8
BPCER 14.50 13.89 14.66 16.83 15.38 16.68 15.88 16.03 16.53 16.37 14.58 14.47 15.73 15.5± 0.9
ACER 17.15 16.52 22.71 22.49 24.37 8.49 10.19 42.47 8.26 25.79 33.85 24.50 9.61 20.4± 10.3
EER 16.88 16.53 21.80 20.73 21.94 7.34 9.88 32.56 2.37 23.51 31.72 21.94 10.05 18.2± 9.0
MC-LBP-SVM
APCER 10.77 12.91 10.28 35.19 37.78 0.59 6.50 96.09 0.00 26.00 40.91 35.51 2.73 24.2± 26.3
BPCER 22.90 22.18 22.48 22.33 23.13 23.70 23.59 22.79 23.93 22.90 19.92 21.11 23.74 22.6± 1.1
ACER 16.83 17.54 16.38 28.76 30.46 12.15 15.04 59.44 11.97 24.45 30.41 28.31 13.24 23.4± 12.9
EER 15.96 16.83 16.87 28.51 29.77 10.54 12.75 52.60 1.90 24.61 28.32 26.76 11.29 21.2± 12.6
Auxiliary [19]
APCER 23.7 7.3 27.7 18.2 97.8 8.3 16.2 100.0 18.0 16.3 91.8 72.2 0.4 38.3± 37.4
BPCER 10.1 6.5 10.9 11.6 6.2 7.8 9.3 11.6 9.3 7.1 6.2 8.8 10.3 8.9± 2.0
ACER 16.8 6.9 19.3 14.9 52.1 8.0 12.8 55.8 13.7 11.7 49.0 40.5 5.3 23.6± 18.5
EER 14.0 4.3 11.6 12.4 24.6 7.8 10.0 72.3 10.1 9.4 21.4 18.6 4.0 17.0± 17.7
Deep Tree Network [28]
APCER 1.0 0.0 0.7 24.5 58.6 0.5 3.8 73.2 13.2 12.4 17.0 17.0 0.2 17.1± 23.3
BPCER 18.6 11.9 29.3 12.8 13.4 8.5 23.0 11.5 9.6 16.0 21.5 22.6 16.8 16.6± 6.2
ACER 9.8 6.0 15.0 18.7 36.0 4.5 7.7 48.1 11.4 14.2 19.3 19.8 8.5 16.8± 11.1
EER 10.0 2.1 14.4 18.6 26.5 5.7 9.6 50.2 10.1 13.2 19.8 20.5 8.8 16.1± 12.2
DeepPixBiS [10]
APCER 19.18 8.97 1.74 21.30 60.68 0.00 1.00 100.00 0.00 26.90 64.66 77.52 0.29 29.4± 34.4
BPCER 8.70 7.63 11.03 11.76 10.27 8.85 8.63 10.53 11.60 10.99 10.31 10.23 7.10 9.8± 1.4
ACER 13.94 8.30 6.38 16.53 35.47 4.43 4.81 55.27 5.80 18.95 37.48 43.87 3.69 19.6± 17.4
EER 11.68 7.94 7.22 15.04 21.30 3.78 4.52 26.49 1.23 14.89 23.28 18.90 4.82 12.3± 8.2
MCCNN (BCE)
APCER 38.93 30.60 7.85 20.00 32.56 0.00 2.00 70.65 0.00 29.00 46.69 57.32 23.20 27.6± 22.1
BPCER 7.10 6.45 7.48 10.04 12.56 8.59 10.04 9.96 11.72 11.37 12.75 7.71 9.89 9.6± 2.0
ACER 23.01 18.52 7.66 15.02 22.56 4.29 6.02 40.31 5.86 20.19 29.72 32.52 16.54 18.6± 11.1
EER 17.08 11.83 7.56 12.82 16.09 0.71 6.85 25.94 2.29 16.30 18.90 22.82 13.13 13.2± 7.4
MCCNN (BCE+OCCL)-GMM
APCER 11.79 9.53 3.12 3.70 39.20 0.00 3.12 44.57 0.00 21.60 19.34 35.55 0.00 14.7± 15.9
BPCER 13.44 16.15 16.26 20.23 11.11 13.74 8.66 15.23 12.67 10.42 14.31 18.40 27.33 15.2± 4.8
ACER 12.61 12.84 9.69 11.97 25.16 6.87 5.89 29.90 6.34 16.01 16.83 26.97 13.66 14.9± 7.8
EER 12.82 12.94 11.33 13.70 13.47 0.56 5.60 22.17 0.59 15.14 14.40 23.93 9.82 12.0± 6.9
TABLE VII
THE RESULTS FROM THE CROSS-DATABASE TESTING BETWEEN WMCA
AND SIW-M DATASETS USING THE GRANDTEST PROTOCOL, ONLY RGB
CHANNELS WERE USED IN THIS EXPERIMENT.
Method
trained on
WMCA
trained on
SiW-M
tested on
WMCA
tested on
SiW-M
tested on
SiW-M
tested on
WMCA
MC-RDWT-Haralick-SVM 14.6 29.6 15.1 45.3
MC-LBP-SVM 26.6 45.5 19.6 38.6
MC-RDWT-Haralick-GMM 27.9 34.0 25.5 43.6
DeepPixBiS 7.5 49.1 14.7 44.4
MCCNN (BCE) 12.1 34.0 9.9 42.3
MCCNN (BCE+OCCL)-GMM 12.3 31.9 9.5 41.8
is comparable in the known attack scenario. This indicates that
the proposed One-Class GMM based approach performs par
with binary classification, thanks to the embedding learned
with the proposed loss function. Most of the approaches
perform well in the unseen-2D protocol since it can be clearly
discriminated in many channels. Moreover, it shows that if
the network is trained in challenging attacks, simpler attacks
are easy to detect. While the performance is comparable
in grandtest and unseen-2D protocols, the proposed method
achieves a large performance boost in the most challenging
unseen-3D protocol. The proposed loss function forces the
network to learn a compact representation for bonafide sam-
ples in the feature space. Both known and unknown attacks get
mapped far from the bonafide cluster in the feature space. The
decision boundary learned by the one class model seems to be
robust in identifying both seen and unseen attacks in such a
scenario. This result is significant for several reasons. It is to be
noted that in the unseen-3D protocol, the network is trained
with only 2D attacks, i.e., prints and replays. The proposed
method achieves excellent performance in a test set consisting
of challenging 3D attacks such as custom silicone masks,
paper masks, mannequins, etc. The real-world implications of
this approach is very promising. The proposed method can be
used to develop robust PAD systems without the requirement
of having to manufacture costly presentation attacks. The
models can be trained on easy to obtain attacks based on
availability. The proposed framework utilizes the available
(known) attack categories to learn a robust representation to
facilitate known and unseen attack detection. It is to be noted
that the compact representation is made possible by the joint
multi-channel representation used.
In practical deployment scenarios, it may not be possible
to use all the four channels due to the computational or cost
constraints. In such a situation, models trained on available
channels can be selected based on the performance-cost ratio
by sub selecting the channels. The results from the ablation
study presented in Table IV can be used to determine which
channels should be used in such cases.
Similarly, the experiments in MLFP and SiW-M database
also shows CNN based methods outperform feature-based
baselines. Although we have not used multi-channel informa-
tion in the experiments, the experiment results showcase the
performance improvement with the new loss function. Using
the proposed framework together with network backbones
designed specifically for RGB PAD might improve the results.
The cross-database performance shows the limitations of
the RGB channel when tested with a wide variety of attacks.
The performance of the baselines as well as the proposed
approach is poor when only RGB data is used. This shows
the challenging nature of RGB only PAD while considering
a wide variety of attacks. The usage of multiple channels as
done in WMCA dataset might improve the performance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Face presentation attack detection is often considered as a
binary classification task which results in over-fitting to the
known attacks leading to poor generalization against unseen
attacks. In this paper, we address this problem with a new
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framework using a one-class classifier. A novel loss function
is formulated, which forces the CNN to learn a compact yet
discriminative representation for the face images. The bonafide
samples form a compact cluster in the feature space, thanks
to the proposed loss function. A decision boundary around
the bonafide representation can be obtained using a one-class
model. Both known and unknown attacks map far from the
bonafide cluster in the feature space which can be classified
by the one-class model. The proposed framework introduces a
new way to learn a robust PAD system from bonafide and
available (known) attack classes. The proposed system has
been evaluated in the challenging WMCA, MLFP, and SiW-M
databases and was shown to outperform the baseline feature-
based and CNN based methods in both known and unseen
attack scenarios. The drastic improvement in the performance
in unseen-3D protocol in WMCA shows the robustness of
the proposed approach against unseen attacks, thanks to the
multi-channel information. The proposed method also shows
improvement even when used together with RGB channels
alone. The source code and protocols to reproduce the results
are made available publicly to enable further extensions of the
proposed framework.
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